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Abstract: 
This report presents an empirical study of the average Laffer curve of Swedish municipalities, 
with a focus on determining whether the position of the peak of the curve has shifted or, put 
differently, whether the optimal value of the average municipal tax rate has changed over time. A 
regression model based on the Laffer curve relationship between tax revenue and tax rates and 
including several control variables is proposed. The results from several regressions for different 
time periods between the years 2000 and 2017 are presented, and they contain some evidence 
suggesting that the position of the peak of the average Laffer curve of Swedish municipalities 
moved during the period from 2000 to 2017. 
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1  Introduction 
All Swedish municipalities impose a flat tax on the incomes earned by their citizens. The 
municipal income tax is an important source of revenue for the municipalities and contributes to 
the funding of a variety of services that they provide to their citizens, including basic welfare 
services such as education, daycare and eldercare. 
  
Each municipality determines its local income tax rate, and historically the rates have varied over 
time and between municipalities. A typical reason why a municipality might change the rate is 
that the costs for the services it provides have increased. The rate may, however, be adjusted for 
reasons that are not directly related to the economic situation of the municipality. For example, 
newly-elected politicians may prefer that the current tax rate be raised or lowered simply for 
ideological reasons. As another example, some studies have shown that a lowering of the tax rate 
in one municipality tends to be followed by similar tax decreases in neighboring municipalities, 
possibly as a result of politicians trying to reduce the risk of people moving in order to lower 
their taxes (Edmark & Ågren 2008). 
 
Since people may adjust their trade-off between labor and leisure, or may change their behavior 
in some other way, in response to a tax rate decrease or increase, the tax revenue do not 
necessarily change linearly with a change in tax rate. This is graphically illustrated by the so-
called Laffer curve, which shows a proposed dependence of tax revenue on tax rates. As 
originally depicted, the Laffer curve has the shape of an inverted U, the top of the curve 
representing the tax rate above which an increase results in lower, not higher, tax revenue. In 
other words, the Laffer curve implies that increasing the tax rate above a maximum rate has 
adverse effects on the productivity of the economy, which counteracts the tax increase. Clearly, 
if the assumptions behind the Laffer curve hold, politicians should be wary not to increase tax 
rates beyond the top of the curve. 
 
A complicating factor is that, since the shape of the Laffer curve essentially reflects people’s 
preferences, the shape may change if people’s preferences change or if people with different 
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preferences move into or out of a municipality. This obviously makes it more difficult to 
determine a suitable tax rate, and tax policy makers should preferably be informed if the Laffer 
curve relevant to their jurisdiction changes shape or if the top moves. 
 
The general objective of the present study is to examine the average Laffer curve of Swedish 
municipalities. The main question which this study seeks to answer is whether the top of that 
curve has moved during the years from 2000 to 2017. That is to say, has the optimal value of the 
average municipality tax rate changed during this period? 
 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review of previous 
work on topics related to the present study. Section 3 provides a theoretical background to the 
study, and Section 4 presents the regression model. Next, in Section 5, follows a discussion of 
the empirical data used for estimating the regression model. The results of the regression analysis 
are presented and discussed in Section 6, and, finally, Section 7 concludes and summarizes the 
report.  
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2 Literature review 
The Laffer curve has been discussed in many studies conducted to better understand various 
relationships between tax revenue and rates of taxation. This section presents a brief summary of 
some of the previous work that is particularly relevant to the present study. 
 
For instance, much work has been devoted to estimating Laffer curves for the economies of 
entire countries in order to determine where on the curve the country is located and, in particular, 
whether or not the country is located on the downward-sloping section of the curve. For 
example, in an early paper, Fullerton (1982) uses a microeconomic model to estimate Laffer 
curves for the United States. The model includes nineteen producers, fifteen commodities and 
twelve consumer groups representing different levels of income. The model is parametrized 
using governmental data for 1973 and solved to obtain Laffer curves illustrating the relationship 
between tax revenue and income tax. The curves are computed for different labor supply 
elasticities ranging from 0.15 and 4.00, and Fullerton finds that the economy of the United States 
was probably not operating in the so-called prohibitive range of the Laffer curve, i.e. the 
downward-sloping section, provided that the actual labor elasticity is not close to the high end of 
the range. 
  
Laffer curves for Sweden have also been estimated. Stuart (1981), for example, uses a model in 
which a single household divides labor between a taxed sector and an untaxed sector. The taxed 
sector is the regular part of the economy where labor is taxed, and the untaxed sector represents 
labor that is not taxed, such as household work in one’s own home and undeclared work in the 
illicit economy. The model includes various analytical functions, such as a Cobb-Douglas 
production function assigned to each sector and a household utility function which determine the 
allocation of labor between the sectors, and these functions are parametrized using empirical data 
with a base year of 1969. The model is solved numerically to obtain the tax on labor income that 
maximizes revenue. The tax rate is found to be circa 70 percent, while the actual tax rate at the 
time was circa 80 percent.   
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Similar to Stuart (1981), Feige and McGee (1983) estimate Laffer curves for Sweden while 
taking into account not only the observed part of the economy but also the unobserved part. 
However, they divide the unobserved part into a monetary sector, corresponding to activities that 
are intentionally not reported to avoid taxes, and a non-monetary sector, corresponding to 
activities that are not taxable, such as work in one’s home. Hence, their model divides the 
economy into three parts: a monetary observed sector, a monetary unobserved sector and a non-
monetary unobserved sector, or the black economy. They derive Sweden’s Laffer curve by 
numerically solving a set of equations which describe the interaction between these sectors using 
utility, production, labor supply functions, etc., which have been parametrized using empirical 
data with a base year of 1979. Their result agrees with that of Stuart (1981) in that they conclude 
that Sweden at the time had probably passed its Laffer curve peak. 
  
In contrast with the two preceding papers, the focus of this report is not Sweden as a nation but 
rather Swedish municipalities. This was also the focus of a recent study by Stener and 
Wintenstråle (2016). Specifically, they compute an average Laffer curve for 286 Swedish 
municipalities using five different models of varying degrees of complexity. In the simplest 
model, the tax revenue is the dependent variable and the municipal tax rate is the only 
independent variable. The other models include additional dependent variables, such as 
education, unemployment and time trend controls. The parameters of the models are estimated 
with a regression analysis using empirical data from 1992 to 2015. The authors find that the peak 
of the Laffer curve for the municipalities is located at 31.38 percent, slightly lower than the 
average municipal tax rate during 1992 to 2015, which they compute to be 31.95 percent. It is 
noted that this tax rate seems to correspond to the sum of the tax that is allocated to the 
municipalities1 and the tax that is allocated to the county council2. It is also noted that the authors 
do not investigate whether the position of the Laffer curve peak has moved, unlike the present 
study, and their model does not include variables corresponding to the tax base and political 
ideology variables used in the present study. 
 
                                                 
1 Swedish: “kommuner”. 
2 Swedish: “landsting”. 
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Stener and Wintenstråle assume that the Laffer curve has a parabolic shape, which is the 
conventional shape of the curve, and this assumption is also made in the present study, see 
Section 3.3. It should be noted, however, that this assumption may not always hold, and there 
have been studies investigating under what conditions the curve is parabolic and what factors 
may affect the shape of the curve.  
 
Malcomson (1986), for example, considers a three-good economy consisting of one private 
good, one public good and labor which is provided by identical consumers whose income is 
taxed. He develops an algebraic expression for the tax revenue as a function of the tax rate, and, 
based on an algebraic analysis of the behavior of this function, he argues that the shape of the 
Laffer curve may depart from the conventional, parabolic shape, even under reasonable 
assumptions regarding, in particular, how hours of work depend on changes in the income tax 
rate. For example, he shows that the Laffer curve may lack an interior maximum and may be 
discontinuous when the tax rate equals 100 percent. Malcomson’s study thus suggests that it may 
in some situations be necessary to allow for the Laffer curve to depart from the parabolic shape.  
  
This conclusion may also be drawn from a study by Guesnerie and Jerison (1991). Like 
Malcomson (1986), they include three goods in their model – a private consumption good, a 
public good and labor provided by consumers – and they analyze the model algebraically. Their 
model does, however, differ from Malcomson’s model in several ways, in particular in that it 
allows for consumers’ tastes to differ. Their model predicts that the Laffer curve may, under 
certain assumptions, have several local maxima. In other words, knowing that the Laffer curve 
slopes downward, say, at a current tax rate does not necessarily imply that tax revenue cannot be 
increased by increasing tax rates. 
  
Gahvari (1989) has also studied what affects the shape of the Laffer curve, although with a 
somewhat different focus than Malcomson (1986) and Guesnerie and Jerison (1991). 
Specifically, he investigates how the nature of government’s expenditures affects the shape of 
the Laffer curve. Using an algebraic model, he shows that, if the government uses its tax revenue 
to give cash transfers to consumers, increasing the tax rate eventually causes the labor supply to 
start declining. The Laffer curve then has the conventional, parabolic shape. On the other hand, if 
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the government uses its tax revenue to finance military operations or some other government 
good, the Laffer curve may always slope upwards. That is to say, the expansionary effects of 
government spending may dominate the contractionary effects of raised taxes over the entire tax 
range. 
  
Finally, similar results to those of Gahvari (1989) have been obtained more recently by Besci 
(2000), who found that different Laffer curves are associated with different types of government 
spending. He arrived at this conclusion by first deriving six algebraic equations describing 
various conditions on marginal rates of substitution between labor and leisure, the marginal 
products of labor and capital, and the government’s budget constraint. He then analyzes the 
equations to deduce how public expenditures affect household and firm decisions and, thus, the 
(long-term) disposition of the Laffer curve. He finds that there will be no long-term change in the 
shape of the Laffer curve if the government uses the increase in tax revenue to make lump-sum 
transfers to firms and households. If the government, on the other hand, invests the increase in 
revenue, the long-term Laffer curve will move upwards. Lastly, if the government uses the 
revenue increase for consumption, the long-term Laffer curve is moved upwards even further. 
Thus, the way in which the government spends revenue has an impact on the economic activity 
and, consequently, also the revenue resulting from a tax increase.  
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3  Theoretical framework 
The theoretical background to the present study is discussed in this section. 
3.1  The Laffer curve 
The question whether an increase in tax rate will lead to a direct increase in tax revenue or not is 
hardly a modern phenomenon. For example, the issue was addressed as early as in the 18th 
century by Adam Smith (Smith 1776), where he already then argued that higher taxes would lead 
to smaller government revenue through a loss in consumption. About two centuries later, Arthur 
Laffer presented a relationship between tax revenue and tax rate as a curve having the shape of 
an inverted U, and the curve has since then been part of modern economics. 
 
The basic concept of the Laffer curve is very intuitive (Laffer 2004 & Wanniski 1978). The 
curve represents a relationship between tax rate and tax revenue. Tax revenue by Laffer’s 
definition is the product of the average tax rate and the tax base. Laffer argued that if the average 
tax rate is zero, then there understandably is no tax revenue. If the tax rate on the other hand is 
100 percent, then the tax revenue would also be zero because no rational individual would 
generate a tax base for a 100 percent tax. In between these extremes, as the tax rate is increased 
from zero to 100 percent, the tax revenue must first increase, reach a maximum, and finally 
decrease. This gives the Laffer curve its characteristic shape, as seen in Figure 1.     
3.2  Microeconomic perspective 
To fully understand the underlying factors behind the Laffer curve, its origin and shape, we must 
also incorporate the microeconomic theory of rational choice in the analysis, an account of which 
can be found in for example the textbook by Perloff (2014). The discussion in this section is 
based on the account given in that book.  
 
A starting assumption is here made that individuals make choices that will maximize their utility, 
and that when choosing between two goods the individual will choose a combination of goods 
that will maximize the utility from these two goods. Figure 2 shows such a scenario, where the 
number of combinations between the two goods are limited by a budget constraint and  
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Figure 1. The Laffer curve. 
Figure 2. The straight line and the curved line represent the  
budget constraint and a utility curve, respectively.  
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the optimal choice for the individual is the point where the budget constraint meets the utility 
curve.  When transferring this concept to an individual’s labor supply, the utility of an individual 
is now dependent on a combination of the two variables income 𝑌 and leisure 𝑁: 
 
𝑈 = 𝑌(𝑌, 𝑁). (1) 
 
The amount of hours 𝐻 that an individual will choose to work per day equals the hours of leisure 
subtracted from the number of hours of a day: 
 
𝐻 = 24 − 𝑁. (2) 
 
Also, an individual’s opportunity cost, or the “price” of leisure, 𝑤 is the hours worked times the 
net gain from one extra hour of work: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑤𝐻 = 𝑤(24 − 𝑁). (3) 
 
With these microeconomic foundations in mind, we can now anticipate how an individual will 
change his or her behavior due to changes in taxes. For this question, we will assume that an 
increase in taxes is equal to a decrease in income. The behavior of individuals will depend on the 
sizes of the income and substitution effects. Figure 3 illustrates a situation where an individual is 
exposed to an increase in income. As income increases, the original budget constraint L1 shifts 
upwards to L2. The new equilibrium point will remain on the original utility curve I1 but at a new 
level of income Y2. A third budget constraint L* will be tangent to the utility curve I
1 at the point 
e*, which is the new equilibrium. The substitution effect is the change from e1 to e* and the 
income effect from e* to e2. We notice that in this case, the income effect is larger than the 
substitution effect and therefore the increase in income will lead to a decrease in hours worked 
for this specific individual. This relationship is what gives the Laffer curve its shape of an 
inverted U, and by examine the income and substitution effects we can determine if the 
individual is located on the upward or downward side of the maximum. In this case, as the 
income effect dominates the substitution effect, this specific individual is located on the  
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Figure 3. Income and substitution effects (Perloff 2014). 
Figure 4. A labor supply curve (Perloff 2014). 
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downward slope of the curve. If, on the other hand, the substitution effect dominates the income 
effect, the individual is located on the upward slope of the curve.  
 
When we transfer this concept from an individual’s perspective to instead investigate all levels of 
wage, we can derive the labor supply curve for the individual, as visualized in Figure 4. H1, H2 
and H3 represents the different amount of hours the individual might choose to work per day, 
each associated with an equilibrium level of wage. Usually in microeconomics, a supply curve is 
always upwards sloping. When prices increase, the supply is expected to follow. Labor supply 
can sometimes act differently. Although we observe an increase in wage, an individual can 
choose to work less. This is due to the income effect being greater than the substitution effect. 
 
The labor supply curve is an effective tool when anticipating how individuals will change their 
behavior due to changes in their income. The elasticity of labor supply 𝑛, defined as the change 
in percent in hours worked, 𝑄ℎ, that follows a one percent change in the price of labor 𝑃𝑤, i.e  
  
𝑛 =  
∆𝑄ℎ
𝑄ℎ
×
𝑃𝑤
∆𝑃𝑤
, (4) 
 
will help us answer what change we can expect in hours worked when the tax on wage changes. 
 
Figure 5 shows different supply curves associated with different elasticities. When the elasticity 
is zero, a change in the price of labor does not lead to a change in hours worked and as the 
elasticity increases towards infinity, hours worked will be more and more sensitive to a change in 
the price of labor. For example, a supply curve with an elasticity of 2 will generate a larger 
change in hours worked when the price of labor changes, in comparison to an elasticity of 0.5. 
The elasticity of the labor supply for individuals will help us understand the shape of the Laffer 
curve. A larger elasticity, i.e. when a change in tax rates will generate a large change in hours 
worked, the Laffer curve will have a steeper slope. If the opposite scenario will occur, i.e. when a 
change in tax rates will generate a small change in hours worked, the curve will occur flatter.   
 
 12 
 
 
When returning to the Laffer curve, we have seen that the expected effect on the amount of hours 
an individual will work followed by an increase in tax varies depending on where the individual 
is located on the labor supply curve. At first, tax revenue will increase simply because hours 
worked will increase. But as tax rates increases, hours worked will eventually decrease since the 
individual will have fewer incentives to work more when the income from that work will not 
follow proportionally, as seen in Figure 4. This principal is directly translated to the Laffer curve, 
as tax revenue will increase along with the tax rate until a maximum is reach. It will then, as be 
seen also in the labor supply curve, decrease as individual’s will gain less income from 
increasing their hours of work.  
 
 
  
Figure 5. Supply curves for different elasticities (Perloff 2014). 
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4  The model 
This section first introduces the regression model which forms the basis of the analysis presented 
in subsequent sections and ends with a brief discussion of some the difficulties associated with 
the type of regression analysis used in this study. 
4.1  The regression model 
In this section, we propose a regression model for studying the average Laffer curve of Swedish 
municipalities. The model is based on the Laffer curve which, assuming a parabolic shape, may 
be written as: 
 
log 𝑅𝑚𝑦 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑚𝑦
2 + 𝜀𝑚𝑦, (5) 
 
where 𝑅𝑚𝑦 represents the tax revenue for municipality m in year y, 𝑇𝑚𝑦 represents the 
municipality tax rates for municipality m in year y, and 𝜀𝑚𝑦 is the error term for municipality m 
in year y. The dependent variable 𝑅𝑚𝑦 is logged in order to receive an interpretation of the 
variable in percentage form. A positive 𝛽1 and a negative 𝛽2 result in a curve having the shape of 
an inverted U, as shown in Figure 1 and discussed in Section 3.  
 
The model used in this study introduces several additions to the Laffer curve (5). As will be 
further discussed below, it includes control variables for public expenditures, unemployment, the 
tax base, and the ruling political majority at the municipal level. The model also includes dummy 
variables to account for time effects. The purpose of including these control variables is to 
reduce the effect of factors that over time may have had a significant effect on tax revenue 
through other channels than the tax rate. Formally, the model which will be used in the 
regressions can be written as: 
 
log 𝑅𝑚𝑦 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑚𝑦
2 + 𝛽3 log 𝐶𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽5log 𝐵𝑚𝑦 (6) 
                  +𝛽6𝐷5𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐷6𝑚𝑦 +  𝑤8𝑡1−18 + 𝛽9𝐹𝐸𝑚 + 𝛽10𝐹𝐸𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑚𝑦, 
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where 𝑅𝑚𝑦, 𝑇𝑚𝑦 and 𝜀𝑚𝑦 are to be interpreted as in equation (5), 𝐶𝑚𝑦 is the public expenditures 
per capita for municipality m in year y, 𝑈𝑚𝑦 the unemployment rate for municipality m in year y 
and 𝐵𝑚𝑦 the tax base for municipality m in year y. 𝐷5𝑚𝑦 is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if center-right politicians are in power in municipality m in year y, and 𝐷6𝑚𝑦 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if a coalition is in power in the municipality m in year y. These 
political dummy variables are intended to capture the impact on the tax revenue of the ruling 
party or parties not being left-wing, which, hence, is the reference case. The dummy variables 
𝑡1−18 capture yearly effects of the years 2000 through 2017 (1-18). Finally,  𝐹𝐸𝑚 represents the 
effect of municipality specific fixed effects and 𝐹𝐸𝑚𝑦 the municipality specific fixed effects over 
time. The variables in the model (6) will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.1. As will be 
further discussed in Section 6, we have regressed the model (6) using different time periods 
during 2000 to 2017 in order to compare the estimates for 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, which define the position of 
the peak of the Laffer curve.  
4.2  Potential problems 
As discussed in Section 2, previous studies regarding the Laffer curve and the effect of tax rates 
on tax revenue have often used theoretical macroeconomic models as the prime method, or in 
other cases, descriptive data analyses. With this comes a series of problems that needs to be 
considered in order to ensure the trustworthiness of the experiment.  
  
First, it is a common problem that this category of experiment suffers from endogeneity 
problems (Wooldridge 2016). It is problematic that the effect of changes in tax rates on tax 
revenue is hard to both isolate and recognize. This could potentially lead to beliefs that what 
initially seems to be a significant relationship is actually not, due to exogenous effects.  
 
It is also questionable to what degree we can assume that theoretical economic models can 
properly be used to solve real-life problems. The microeconomic theories on which the Laffer 
curve is based on will differ between individuals based on several attributions assigned the 
individuals. The measure of abstract values might therefor bias the estimates. 
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Another complicating factor is simultaneity, or reversed causality. A potential reasonable 
scenario might be that a decrease in tax revenue provokes politicians to increase tax rates to stay 
at a chosen level of tax revenue, i.e. a change in tax revenue results in a change in tax rate. Using 
our model, it is difficult to distinguish such a scenario from an opposite situation where a change 
in tax rate results in a change in tax revenue.  
 
In order to reduce these types of problems the study uses econometric methods to elude possible 
biasness. More specific, the study tries to reduce all endogen variation through the incorporation 
of both fixed effects and control variables. 
 
Finally, there is the issue of highly correlated variables. As will be further discussed in Sections 
5.1 and 5.2, the independent variables are, as expected, correlated, but they do not seem to be 
correlated to such a high degree that the validity of the model becomes questionable.  
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5 Data 
This section begins with a general description of the data used in the present study and ends with 
an account of several statistical tests that were performed on the data. 
5.1  General description 
The data gathered comes from Statistics Sweden3 (SCB 2018), except the data on unemployment 
rates and the ruling political ideology, which was gathered from RKA4 (RKA 2018), a nonprofit 
organization with the Swedish government and municipalities as members. The data used is 
organized as panel data, sorted by year from 2000 to 2017. The reason for this specific time 
interval is changes in definition in the main variables and incomplete raw data, limiting the time 
period of the study to 18 years. All of the financial variables were inflation adjusted to the base 
year 2000, using yearly averages of the Consumer Price Index from Statistics Sweden. 
 
As a result of the establishment of the municipality Knivsta in 2003, it is removed from the 
study. We argue that this does not jeopardize the validity of the study since the removed 
observations represents less than a percent of the total number of observations. The resulting 
panel data set is balanced. Further, it should be noted that Gotland is not included in the data set 
because of its special status as a region that not only deals with the responsibilities of regular 
municipalities5 but also some responsibilities normally carried out by county councils6. 
Accordingly, Statistics Sweden does not report the income tax rate for Gotland separated into a 
municipality part and a city council part. 
 
After processing the data, the study relies on yearly data on 288 Swedish municipalities from 
2000 to 2017. Overviewing descriptive statistics of the data can be found in Table 1, and a subset 
of the data is illustrated graphically in Figure 6 (see also Figure 7 in Section 5.2 below). The 
second-to-last row of Table 1 indicates that the municipalities, together, had center-right rule 
during 41.7 percent of the time during the period from 2000 to 2017. The last row should be  
                                                 
3 Swedish: “Statistiska centralbyrån”. 
4 Swedish: “Rådet för främjande av kommunala analyser”.  
5 Swedish: “kommuner”. 
6 Swedish: “landsting”. 
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 Mean Std. dev.  Min. Max. 
Tax revenue per capita  30191 4037  18877 54696 
Municipality tax rate 0.2142 0.117  0.1618 0.2395 
Public expenditures per capita 46697 8556  27300 93297 
Unemployment rate 0.62 0.25  0.11 0.195 
Tax base 179822 31436  123000 430756 
Center-right rule 0.417     
Coalition rule 0.209     
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the data collected for the study. The tax revenue, 
public expenditures and tax base are reported in Swedish krona (SEK)  
 per capita, inflation adjusted to 2000 base year.   
Figure 6. A graphic illustration of tax revenue per capita versus municipality 
tax rate. Each data point represents a specific municipality and a specific 
year. The tax revenue are in Swedish krona per capita, inflation adjusted  
to 2000 base year. 
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interpreted analogously. The dependent variable and the independent variables are described in 
more detail below. 
Tax revenue (𝑅𝑚𝑦) 
The dependent variable of the model (6) is defined as the total amount of real income that a 
municipality receives annually from taxes divided by the number of citizens. Thus, it does not 
include any income from the municipal redistribution system7. Statistics Sweden reports the 
revenue in per capita terms based on the number of inhabitants on December 31st each year. It 
may be noted that using tax revenue per capita represents a departure from the typical definition 
of Laffer curve, which describes a relationship between tax rates and total tax revenue (see 
Section 3.1). Using tax revenue per capita is a way of controlling for tax revenue changes due to 
a population increase or decrease, and this approach has been previously employed by for 
example Hsing (1996).  
Municipality tax rate (𝑇𝑚𝑦) 
The main independent variable of the model, and our a priori assumption is that tax rate changes 
have a major impact on the tax revenue, except possibly when the tax rate is close to the top of 
the Laffer curve, i.e. when the slope of the curve is nearly flat. Also, as discussed in Section 3, a 
tax rate increase may increase or decrease the tax revenue, depending on whether the 
municipality is located on the upward or downward sloping part of the curve. The tax rate in 
Swedish municipalities differs between municipalities and we argue that it therefore provides a 
solid estimate of the impact on the tax revenue of that specific municipality. In order to provide 
an interaction between the tax rate and tax revenue and a fitted line that have the potential to 
simulate the theoretical shape of the Laffer curve, a quadratic term of the tax rate variable is 
included in the model (6). It should be noted that the municipal tax rate as defined in the present 
study does not include the tax that is allocated to the county councils. As noted in Section 2, this 
definition seems to be different from that used by Stener and Wintenstråle (2016).   
Public expenditures (𝐶𝑚𝑦) 
One of the control variables included in the model is the public expenditures per capita of the 
municipalities. We argue that a larger public sector would reflect the characteristics of a 
                                                 
7 Swedish: “Kommunala utjämningssystemet”.  
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municipality regarding demographics, which could possibly affect the tax revenue through other 
channels than the direct tax rate. Expenditures on education, eldercare and daycare constitute a 
major portion of the total expenditures of the municipalities. We expect municipalities with large 
public sectors to generally collect correspondingly large tax revenues to finance the public 
expenditures. 
Unemployment (𝑈𝑚𝑦) 
Another control variable we assume affects the tax revenue is unemployment. We believe this to 
be a relevant control variable because economic intuition tells us that a larger number of 
employed citizens in a municipality would increase the tax revenue through another channel than 
the tax rate. The unemployment variable would also capture the economic situation of the 
municipality, since a high unemployment is corresponding to a low growth rate and vice versa. 
RKA reports the unemployment rate for the month of March each year. Further, the 
unemployment rate is here defined as the number of persons who are aged between 18 and 64 
years and unemployed, divided by the total number of inhabitants. 
Tax base (𝐵𝑚𝑦) 
Defined as the taxable income per capita in a municipality of the previous year, the tax base is 
included in the model because of its intuitive effect on tax revenue. Since tax revenue is defined 
as the tax base times the tax rate, it seems reasonable that the two components with a direct 
influence on tax revenue should be included in the model. It is noted that the data does not 
include firms or other legal entities. Our expectation is that a municipality collects more tax 
revenues when its tax base increases and less tax revenue when its tax base decreases.  
Ruling political ideology (𝐷5𝑚𝑦 and 𝐷6𝑚𝑦) 
Our model allows for the political affiliation of the party or parties in power to have an impact on 
municipalities’ tax revenue per capita. Although we do not expect such an effect to be large, it is 
conceivable that it exists. For example, voters in municipalities having right-wing parties in 
power can reasonably be expected to have a generally low willingness to pay taxes and therefore 
prone to adopt strategies to lower their taxes by maximizing tax deductions, for instance. Our 
data classifies the political affiliation of the politicians in power into one of the following three 
categories: (i) left-wing, (ii) center-right, and (iii) coalition. By left-wing rule is meant rule by 
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the Swedish Social Democratic Party and/or the Left Party. By center-right rule is meant rule by 
one or more of the Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals and the Centre Party. 
By coalition rule is meant rule by one or more of the center-right parties together with one or 
both of the left-wing parties. All three types of rule may include the Green Party or some other 
party not included in the categories (i) and (ii) above. It may be noted that although elections are 
held every four years, there are a few cases where the ruling political majority changes without 
the year being an election year. A possible reason for this could be politicians leaving a ruling 
party that has a thin majority.  
Fixed Effects (𝐹𝐸𝑚 and 𝐹𝐸𝑚𝑦) 
The method behind fixed effects is founded from the idea that the individual specific effects are 
correlated with the error term and by controlling for these, the variation of the variable in interest 
will decrease. To capture the internal variation, i.e. variation over time within one municipality, 
fixed effects are included in the model. We include the fixed effects to reduce problems 
associated with hidden variation in the variables. 
Time variables (𝑡1−18) 
As illustrated in Figure 7, there seems to be a general upward trend in the tax revenue per capita, 
which could indicate that the estimates will be biased unless the model controls for this tendency. 
In order to control for possible time effects, we have chosen to include a set of yearly dummy 
variables in the model (6), similarly to Edmark and Ågren (2008). Thereby, the model allows for 
the effects associated with time to differ between years. Thus, each time variable is a dummy 
variable intended to capture events which affect the tax revenue of all of the municipalities 
similarly during a specific year. An example of such an event might be a crisis which 
temporarily leads to a change in the general economic outlook of the entire country and a 
corresponding change in the behavior of people and companies, affecting the municipalities’ tax 
revenue. Such crises might for example be the burst of the IT bubble and the financial crisis of 
the early and late 2000s, respectively. It is noted that an alternative approach could be to include 
a linear time trend variable instead of yearly dummy variables. We did not choose this approach 
because the wavy shape of the tax revenue in Figure 7 seems to suggest that the time effects may 
vary between years, as will be further discussed in the next section. 
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5.2  Tests 
To ensure the model’s reliability and to what degree of certainty the results can be interpreted, a 
series of tests has been conducted to investigate the most common problems with time series 
data. First, the model is tested for potential highly persistent variables. A variable is highly 
persistent if 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑃1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 , (7) 
 
where 𝑃1 = 1 and 𝑌𝑡 in this case being the dependent variable tax revenue, although the test 
includes all variables in the model (Wooldridge 2016). We also know that 
 
𝑃1 = corr (𝑌𝑡, 𝑌𝑡−1). (8) 
 
If the absolute value of 𝑃1 is close to 1, a highly persistent variable is suspected. After testing for 
highly persistent variables we conclude that there to some degree are persistent variable present 
in the model, but not to a degree that would severely contaminate the estimates. The results are 
presented in Table 2 and we notice that the largest absolute value is 0.57, which is at a 
comfortable distance from 1.  
 
Secondly, we examine if there are trending variables in the model. If a variable increases or 
decreases over the sample period, the variable is a trending variable. If both the dependent 
variable and the explanatory variable is trending, then coefficient estimates might be biased 
(Wooldridge 2016). After having regressed each of the continuous variables of the model on a 
linear time variable, we concluded that all of them grow over time. In order to account for the 
overall upward trend exhibited by the continuous variables, we therefore included a set of yearly 
dummy time variables in the model. The model is thereby able to capture not only an overall 
linear time trend in the data but also, as discussed in Section 5.1, other temporal effects, such as 
year-specific effects.  
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Thirdly, it is investigated if the model suffers from seasonality. If a variable demonstrates a 
periodic pattern over the sample period, seasonality might be present in the data. If both the 
dependent variable and an independent variable have seasonality, coefficient estimates might be 
biased (Wooldridge 2016). We find no clear evidence of seasonality in the dependent variable by 
visual inspection of Figure 7. Should yearly seasonality be present in one or more of the 
independent variables, such effects will be captured by the set of dummy time variables in the 
model (6).  
 
Another common problem with time series data is serially correlated errors, which occurs when 
the present error term correlates with a past error term. This potential problem may lead to 
incorrect standard errors, but the unbiasedness and consistency of the estimates are not affected 
(Wooldridge 2016). We investigate potential serially correlated errors by looking at the null 
hypothesis 
 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0, (9) 
 
and the alternative hypothesis 
 
𝐻𝑎: 𝜌 ≠ 0, (10) 
 
where 
 
𝜌 = corr (𝑈𝑡, 𝑈𝑡−1). (11) 
 
We find that there is significant evidence for first order autocorrelation in the error term and the 
null hypothesis is rejected. As a solution to this, we use the Driscoll and Kraay method which is 
appropriate for the type of panel data used in this study and produces standard errors which are 
robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Driscoll & Kraay 1998). 
 
Another potential problem is that the model might not achieve strict exogeneity, something 
which may cause the regression estimates to be biased. Completely strict exogeneity is close to 
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impossible to reach. However, a lack thereof is usually not a major issue with larger sample 
sizes, and in this study we assume that the sample size is large enough to avoid a strict 
exogeneity problem (Wooldridge 2016).  
 
Lastly, the pairwise correlations between the independent variables were also computed. Some of 
the variables can reasonably be expected to correlate to some degree. For example, we expect the 
unemployment rate to be negatively correlated with the tax base and positively correlated with 
public expenditures, since the tax base and the public expenditures of a municipality are likely to 
decrease and increase, respectively, when the unemployment rate increases. As another example, 
it seems likely that the tax base and the political affiliation of the party in power are correlated to 
some degree, since high-income earners and low-income earners can reasonably be expected to 
predominately vote for right-wing parties favoring tax cuts and left-wing parties opposing tax 
cuts, respectively. 
 
Our correlation test showed that the largest absolute value of the pairwise correlations between 
the independent variables were circa 0.5. Thus, contrary to some of our apprehensions, neither of 
the independent variables correlated to such a degree that would eliminate any of them as useful 
control variables. Specifically, we note that the control variables indicating political ruling in the 
municipalities did not correlate to a large degree with any of the other independent variables.  
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  𝑃1 
Tax revenue  0.21 
Income tax rate   0.57 
Public expenditures per capita   0.41 
Unemployment rate   0.25 
Tax base 0.51 
Center-right rule   0.14 
Coalition rule  0.04 
Table 2. Results from the correlation tests investigating highly persistent variables. 
 
 
Figure 7. A graphic illustration of the tax revenue per capita for each year. 
Each data point represents a specific municipality. The tax revenue are  
in Swedish krona per capita, inflation adjusted to 2000 base year. 
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6 Results 
This section presents the results of the regression analyses on the panel data presented in Section 
5. In order to be able to determine whether the position of the top of the municipalities’ average 
Laffer curve has moved over time, i.e. whether the average optimal tax rate has changed, the 
coefficients of the independent variables in the model (6) were estimated for several different 
time periods between 2000 and 2017. Our hope is to identify any changes by comparing 
estimates for different time periods. 
 
The estimates of the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, which multiplying the tax rate variables in model 
(6), are our main interest, because they define the position of the top of the Laffer curve. 
Specifically, by taking the derivative of the right-hand side of equation (6) with respect to the tax 
rate and setting the result to zero, one finds that the maximum of the Laffer curve occurs at a tax 
rate of 
 
−
𝛽1
2𝛽2
 . (12) 
 
Initially, we chose to perform the regression using six consecutive three-year periods, in order to 
be able to compare estimates for many time periods, almost as many as our data set allows while 
still keeping some of the advantages associated with the data having a panel structure. Since the 
significance levels of the estimates obtained from these regressions were rather low, we also 
performed regressions using three six-year periods and two nine-year periods in an attempt to see 
whether or not using longer time periods would improve the significance levels. Lastly, we 
performed a regression using data on the entire period for which we have data, i.e. from 2000 to 
2017.  
 
All of the regressions were fixed-effects regressions, using Driscoll and Kraay standard errors as 
implemented in the software Stata (Hoechle 2007) for the purpose of obtaining robust coefficient 
estimates. In order to account for autocorrelation (see the discussion in Section 5.2), the 
regressions were performed with lag a length of one year (Section 6.1) or two years (Sections 
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6.2, 6.3 and 6.4). The lag lengths were computed using the following formula suggested by 
Hoechle (2007): 
 
floor (4 × (𝑇 100)⁄
2 9⁄
) , (13) 
 
where T is the number of periods, which equals three, six, nine or seventeen, depending on the 
regression. 
6.1  Three-year periods 
We have performed six separate regressions, where each regression used data on one of the 
periods 2000 to 2002, 2003 to 2005, 2006 to 2008, 2009 to 2011, 2012 to 2014, and 2015 to 
2017. As can be seen in Table 3, the F-statistics of these regressions indicate that the independent 
variables are jointly statistically significant at levels above the 90 percent confidence level 
except for the two periods spanning 2009 to 2014. Thus, for the periods spanning 2000 to 2008 
and the period 2015 to 2017, the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients multiplying the 
independent variables are zero may be rejected with an acceptable level of confidence. The R-
squared within values vary between 27 percent and 90 percent, so the degree to which the model 
(6) explains the variation in the tax revenue varies considerably between periods. 
 
Table 3 also shows the estimates obtained for the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. For the three periods 
2006 to 2008, 2009 to 2011, and 2015 to 2017, the estimates for both 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are significant at 
or above the 90 percent confidence level. For these periods, the term that is linear in the tax rate 
(𝛽1) is estimated to be positive, and the coefficient that is quadratic in the tax rate (𝛽2) is 
estimated to be negative. This means that the tax revenue as a function of the tax rate has the 
shape of an inverted U, i.e. the conventional Laffer curve shape, and this result agrees with the 
assumptions behind the model in equation (6). The estimates for 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 yield that the 
maximum of the Laffer curve occurs at 29 percent, 33 percent and 29 percent during the periods 
2006 to 2008, 2009 to 2011, and 2015 to 2017, respectively, indicating that the top of the Laffer 
curve has not remained at the same position during these years. The magnitude of the shift 
indicated by these percentages seems large for such short time periods and should probably be 
interpreted with caution. As reported in Table 1 and Figure 6, the municipal tax rates were 
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between circa 16 percent and circa 24 percent during the entire period from 2000 through 2017, 
so we conclude that the municipalities do not seem to have taxed beyond the Laffer curve peak 
during the years 2006 to 2011 and 2015 to 2017. 
 
We have not computed where the top of the Laffer curve is located for the other periods, i.e. 
2001 to 2002, 2003 to 2005 and 2012 to 2014, because the significance level of either both or 
one of the estimates for the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 for these periods is lower than 90 percent, 
which makes meaningful comparisons between periods difficult. Further, we note that the 
estimates for the period 2003 to 2005 are both positive, something which implies that the Laffer 
curve has the shape of a U, rather than an inverted U. This result appears to be rather 
counterintuitive.  
 
The regression results for the control variable coefficients are set out in Tables 4 and 5. The 
significance levels of these estimates varies between the different periods from below to above 
90 percent in what appears to be a fairly random manner. The fact that many of the estimates 
have low statistical significance seems to suggest that they often have had little or no impact on 
the tax revenue. However, we do not believe there is sufficient evidence concerning their effects 
to draw reliable conclusions and, in particular, to make valid comparisons between periods.  
6.2  Six-year periods 
We have performed three separate regressions, where each regression used data on one of the 
periods 2000 to 2005, 2006 to 2011, and 2012 to 2017. Table 3 shows that the F-statistics of 
these regressions are well above the 90 percent confidence level, and the null hypothesis that all 
of the coefficients multiplying the independent variables are zero may therefore be rejected with 
high confidence for all three periods. The R-squared within value varies between 74 percent and 
94 percent, representing an improvement compared with the regression in Section 6.1. 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, for two of these periods, i.e. 2006 to 2011 and 2012 to 2017, the 
estimates for both 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are significant at a level well above 90 percent. The significance 
level of the estimates for 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 for the period 2000 to 2005 is by contrast well below 90 
percent. For all three periods, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 and are estimated to be positive and negative, 
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respectively, which is consistent with a Laffer curve having an inverted U shape. During the 
period 2006 to 2011, the maximum of the Laffer curve occurred at 30 percent, and, during the 
period 2012 to 2017, the maximum of the Laffer curve occurred at 36 percent. This results 
suggest that the top of the curve moved during these periods. The magnitude of the movement 
appears quite large for such short time periods and, again, should probably be interpreted with 
caution. 
 
The results for the control variable coefficients are set out in Tables 4 and 5. Again, the statistical 
significance of these estimates varies considerably between periods and, in addition, are in many 
cases low.   
6.3  Nine-year periods 
We have performed two separate regressions, where each regression used data on one of the 
periods 2000 to 2008 and 2009 to 2017. As can be seen in Table 3, and similarly to the 
regressions in Section 6.2, the F-statistics of both of these regressions are well above the 90 
percent confidence level. The R-squared within value is 94 percent for both periods, so the 
model (6) explains the variance within municipalities to a high degree for these periods. 
 
Table 3 shows that the 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 estimates for the first period, i.e. 2000 to 2008, are both 
positive, which is inconsistent with an inverted U-type Laffer curve, as noted in Section 6.1. The 
statistical significance of these estimates is, however, very low. The 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 estimates for the 
period 2009 to 2017 are positive and negative, respectively, and they are thus consistent with an 
inverted U-type Laffer curve. The 𝛽1 estimate is statistically significant at a level above 90 
percent, whereas the statistical significance of the 𝛽2 estimate is far below the 90 percent level.  
 
Again, the results for the control variable coefficients are set out in Tables 4 and 5. Similar to the 
results presented in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, the statistical significance of these estimates varies 
considerably between the two periods and many of them are quite low.    
 
In sum, we do not believe these two regressions have yielded enough evidence to draw reliable 
conclusions regarding the position of the Laffer curve peak during the periods 2000 to 2008 and 
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2009 to 2017. The results regarding the control variables are yet again difficult to interpret 
because of the varying levels of statistical significance. 
6.4  The period 2000 to 2017 
We have performed a regression on the entire data set, i.e. the period 2000 to 2017. As Table 3 
shows, the F-statistic of the regression is well above the 90 percent confidence level, so the 
coefficients multiplying the independent variables are jointly statistically significant at a high 
level. The R-squared within value is about 97 percent, which is higher than in Sections 6.1 to 6.3.  
The 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 estimates are positive and negative, respectively, which is consistent with a Laffer 
curve having an inverted U shape. However, neither estimate is significant at the 90 percent 
confidence level.  
 
The results for the control variable coefficients are set out in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Except for the 
dummy time variables, the estimates for the control variables are all statistically significant 
above the 90 percent confidence level. The public expenditures coefficient (𝛽3) is estimated to be 
positive, the unemployment rate coefficient (𝛽4) is estimated to be negative, and the tax base 
coefficient (𝛽5) is estimated to be positive. The signs of these regression estimates are thus in 
line with how we expected changes in the corresponding variables to affect the tax revenue, see 
the discussion in Section 5.1. Further, the estimates of the coefficients multiplying the political 
dummy variables (𝛽6 and 𝛽7) are negative. This result suggest that, ceteris paribus, the tax 
revenue per capita were on average lower during center-right rule and coalition rule than during 
left-wing rule during 2000 to 2017. This is an interesting result warranting further empirical 
investigation. All but one of the estimates of the coefficients multiplying the dummy time 
variables are negative, which is contrary to our expectation of there being a general positive time 
trend in the data. However, since the significance of many of the estimates is low, this result 
should be interpreted with caution.   
 
In sum, based on this regression, we are unable to establish at any conventional confidence level 
that the tax rate has had an impact on the tax revenue during the period 2000 to 2017, but we are 
able to establish that the many of the control variables have had such an impact. This result is 
unexpected, and contrary to our expectation, since the tax rate can reasonably be expected to 
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have a large influence on the tax revenue unless the tax rate is close to the top of the Laffer 
curve, which as noted in Section 6.1 probably was not the case during any of the years from 2000 
to 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑏1 𝑏2 Std. error t pt pF R
2 
2000–2002  13 –18  4.4; 11 2.87; –1.67 0.10; 0.24 < 0.01 0.90 
2003–2005  –34 94  13; 31 –2.65; 3.06 0.12; 0.09 < 0.01 0.79 
2006–2008  16 –28  4.3; 9.5 3.82; –2.96 0.06; 0.10 0.08 0.62 
2009–2011  13 –20  2.9; 6.7 4.56; –2.96 0.05; 0.10 0.12 0.27 
2012–2014 13 –20  3.7; 8.8 3.47; –2.25 0.07; 0.15 0.15 0.87 
2015–2017  17 –29  2.0; 5.2 8.49; –5.51 0.01; 0.03 < 0.01 0.86 
2000–2005 9.5 –8.8 7.5; 18 1.26; –0.49  0.26; 0.65 < 0.01 0.92 
2006–2011 18 –31 3.3; 7.4 5.56; –4.13 < 0.01; 0.01 < 0.01 0.74 
2012–2017 13 –18 2.6; 6.3 5.10; –2.92 < 0.01; 0.03 < 0.01 0.94 
2000–2008 2.7 8.3 7.3; 17 0.36; 0.48 0.73; 0.65 < 0.01 0.94 
2009–2017 6.3 –3.2 2.8; 6.3 2.29; –0.51  0.05; 0.62 < 0.01 0.94 
2000–2017 11 –12 7.0; 16 1.55; –0.74 0.14; 0.47 < 0.01 0.97 
Table 3. The columns labelled 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 lists the regression estimates for 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, 
respectively, in the model (6), and the columns labelled pt and pF lists the probabilities 
determined by the t and F statistics, respectively. The estimates and the standard  
errors are reported with two significant figures. The standard errors are robust to  
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. In the columns with two numbers, the  
number to the left refers to 𝑏1, and the number to the right refers to 𝑏2.  
The column labelled R2 lists the R-squared “within” values. 
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 𝑏3 𝑏4 𝑏5 𝑏6      𝑏7 
2000–2002  6.1×10–2 3.4×10–3 0.56 –5.5×10–3 1.1×10–3 
2003–2005  –2.0×10–2 7.5×10–4 0.30 4.3×10–3  
2006–2008  4.8×10–2 3.1×10–3 0.15  1.0×10–2 
2009–2011  4.3×10–2 1.6×10–3 0.36 9.8×10–4 6.9×10–4 
2012–2014  3.5×10–2 –1.2×10–3 0.33 –6.8×10–4 1.1×10–3 
2015–2017  –3.1×10–3 –2.9×10–3 0.15 1.0×10–3 –1.4×10–2 
2000–2005  7.8×10–2 4.0×10–3 0.73 –8.5×10–3 –1.3×10–3 
2006–2011  4.5×10–2 –1.1×10–4 0.62 2.0×10–4 –7.7×10–4 
2012–2017  –2.2×10–2 –4.7×10–3 0.60 –1.9×10–4 4.3×10–5 
2000–2008  6.2×10–2 1.0×10–3 0.67 –6.8×10–3 –4.9×10–3 
2009–2017  –1.2×10–2 –3.7×10–3 0.92 –3.0×10–4 6.7×10–4 
2000–2017  6.4×10–2 –2.5×10–3 1.0 –6.0×10–3 –5.9×10–3 
Table 4. The column labelled 𝑏𝑖 lists the regression results for 𝛽𝑖 in the model (6).  
For two of the three-year periods, the political dummy variables were  
collinear, and Stata therefore omitted one of them. 
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 𝑏3 𝑏4 𝑏5 𝑏6      𝑏7 
00–02 8.9×10–3; 6.902 6.2×10–4; 5.432 0.13; 4.362 3.1×10–4; –17.751 3.1×10–4; –3.483 
03–05 1.9×10–2; –1.07 3.7×10–4; 2.01 0.14; 2.10 1.5×10–3; 2.84  
06–08 2.6×10–2; 1.88 6.5×10–4; 4.742 0.25; 0.59  6.0×10–3; 1.70 
09–11 1.6×10–2; 2.74 6.2×10–4; 2.62 0.15; 2.51 5.0×10–4; 1.97 1.3×10–3; 0.51 
12–14 7.0×10–3; 5.022 2.5×10–4; –5.072 0.15; 2.17 2.3×10–4; –2.973 4.7×10–4; 2.28 
15–17 2.0×10–2; –0.16 8.5×10–4; –3.363 9.8×10–2; 1.55 7.9×10–4; 1.31 6.2×10–4; –23.001 
00–05 1.7×10–2; 4.671 7.0×10–4; 5.751 9.3×10–2; 7.811 1.2×10–3; –7.211 3.7×10–4; –3.672 
06–11 4.6×10–3; 9.701 5.5×10–4; –0.20 0.12; 5.031 6.9×10–4; 0.29 1.3×10–3; –0.58 
12–17 9.2×10–3; –2.353 5.9×10–4; –7.841 6.1×10–2; 9.801 3.3×10–4;–0.58 7.8×10–4; 0.06 
00–08 2.4×10–2; 2.572 1.0×10–3; 0.90 9.6×10–2; 7.011 1.5×10–3; –4.541 1.8×10–3; –2.712 
09–17 1.9×10–2; –0.62 9.1×10–4; –4.041 8.5×10–2; 10.811 4.9×10–4; –0.62 4.3×10–4; 1.55 
00–17 2.2×10–2; 2.941 1.1×10–3; –2.302 6.7×10–2; 15.241 1.7×10–2; –3.511 1.3×10–2; –4.451 
Table 5. The column labelled 𝑏𝑖 lists the regression results for 𝛽𝑖 in the model (6). The numbers 
in each cell refer to, from left to right, the standard error and the t statistic. The standard  
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The superscripts 1, 2 and 3  
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. For two of the 
 three-year periods, the political dummy variables were collinear, and Stata  
therefore omitted one of them. 
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 Estimate Standard error        t 
2001 7.2×10–3 2.9×10–3 2.472 
2002  –9.9×10–3 5.5×10–3 –1.803 
2003  –3.0×10–2  7.6×10–3 –4.011 
2004  –3.7×10–2  8.9×10–3 –4.141 
2005  –3.1×10–2  1.1×10–2 –2.881 
2006 –8.2×10–3 1.2×10–2 –0.66 
2007 –5.4×10–3 1.4×10–2 –0.40 
2008 –1.2×10–2 1.5×10–2 –0.79 
2009 –4.4×10–2 1.8×10–2 –2.422 
2010 –4.9×10–2 1.9×10–2 –2.612 
2011 –3.1×10–2 1.7×10–2 –1.763 
2012 –1.6×10–2 1.8×10–2 –0.87 
2013 –2.7×10–2 2.0×10–2 –1.32 
2014 –3.9×10–2 2.3×10–2 –1.73 
2015 –2.9×10–2 2.5×10–2 –1.17 
2016 –3.8×10–2 2.7×10–2 –1.41 
2017 –3.6×10–2  2.8×10–2 –1.28 
Table 6. The estimated coefficients of the dummy time variables, the reference year being the  
year 2000. The standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
superscripts 1, 2 and 3, denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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7 Conclusion 
In summary, we have presented a simple regression model based on the Laffer curve relationship 
between tax revenue and tax rates and including control variables for public expenditures, 
unemployment rate, taxable income and the political affiliation of the ruling party or parties. The 
model was regressed using empirical data on 288 Swedish municipalities spanning the period 
2000 to 2017 in order to identify possible shifts in the peak of the Laffer curve during this 
period, i.e. whether or not the optimal value of the average municipality tax rate has changed. 
 
Our regression results give some indications that the top of the average Laffer curve of Swedish 
municipalities has moved during the period from 2000 to 2017. However, because of low 
significance levels of many of the regression estimates, we are unable to reliably conclude 
whether or not the peak has shifted during that period and, thus, to clearly answer the main 
question of this study posed in Section 1, i.e. whether or not the optimal value of the average tax 
rate of Swedish municipalities has changed during the period 2000 to 2017. 
 
Regarding the regression results presented in Section 6, it is problematic to the study that some 
of the time periods examined do not show a significant relationship between the tax rate and tax 
revenue, complicating comparisons between time periods. There are several potential 
explanations for this, both within the model as in factors reflected in the raw data. There could, 
for example, be a case where other factors than the tax rate effects tax revenue to such a degree 
that the tax rate becomes insignificant. This would be contrary to our expectations and, in such 
case, the control variables in the model were not fully functional and additional control variables 
would be needed. Another potential scenario that could result in insignificant estimates is 
weaknesses in the regression methods. Specifically if the methods do not match the 
characteristics of the raw data. In this case, the model is to some degree designed to fit the data 
and the potential problems that come with it, as discussed Section 4.2.  
 
A limitation of this study is that the sample size only covers eighteen years, and all of the 
regressions except one are on even shorter time periods (three, six and nine years). Using a larger 
sample that includes more years might improve the significance levels of the estimates. By 
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comparison, Stener and Wintenstråle (2016) used a sample size that covers twenty-four years. 
Also, including a larger sample size with additional election years and, hence, additional political 
power shifts, might result in more precise estimates of the impact of the political affiliation of the 
ruling party. 
 
Another limitation of our model is that it does not consider the varying demographic composition 
of different municipalities, unlike the model used by, Edmark and Ågren (2008), for instance. It 
would be interesting to extend our model to reflect the demography of the municipalities, as 
different age groups may, in general, not only vote differently but also have different attitudes 
towards taxes, something which may affect the shape of the Laffer curve. Also, in our data, the 
ruling parties are classified using only three categories (left-wing rule, center-right rule and 
coalition rule). Future studies could use a more differentiated classification, which includes more 
than three categories, and perhaps capture effects that our model is unable to detect.  
 
Yet another limitation of our model is the assumption that the Laffer curve is parabolic. As noted 
in Section 2, several studies (Malcomson 1986; Guesnerie & Jerison 1991; Gahvari 1989) have 
shown that this assumption may not always hold. The assumption could be relaxed by expressing 
the tax revenue as a more general function of the tax rate than a quadratic polynomial as in 
equations (5) and (6), such as adding a cubic term in the tax rate. However, this approach is 
problematic since the Laffer curve no longer has a unique maximum, which is a premise for this 
study. Nevertheless, we performed a series of test regressions in which a third-order term in the 
tax rate was added to the model (6). We found that the significance of the estimates generally 
improved, but not to a satisfactory level. 
 
To conclude, we hope that, despite the limited conclusions that can be drawn from this work, it 
will inspire further empirical investigations.  
  
 36 
 
References 
Becsi, Z. (2000). The Shifty Laffer Curve. Economic Review, third quarter 2000, pp. 53–64. 
Atlanta: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 
 
Driscoll, J. C. & Kraay, A. C. (1998). Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially 
Dependent Panel Data. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(4), pp. 549–560. 
  
Edmark, K. & Ågren, H. (2008). Identifying strategic interactions in Swedish local income tax 
policies. Journal of Urban Economics, 63(3), pp. 849–857. 
  
Feige, E. L. & McGee, R. T. (1983). Sweden’s Laffer curve: Taxation and the Unobserved 
Economy. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 85(4), pp. 499–519. 
  
Fullerton, D. (1982). On the possibility of an inverse relationship between tax rates and 
government revenue. Journal of Public Economics, 19(1), pp. 3–22. 
  
Gahvari, F. (1989). The nature of government expenditures and the shape of the Laffer curve. 
Journal of Public Economics, 40(2), pp. 251–260. 
  
Guesnerie, R. & Jerison, M. (1991). Taxation as a social choice problem. The scope of the Laffer 
argument. Journal of Public Economics, 44(1), pp. 37–63. 
 
Hoechle, D. (2007). Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional 
dependence. The Stata Journal, 7(3), pp. 281–312.  
 
Hsing, Y. (1996). Estimating the Laffer Curve and Policy Implications. The Journal of Socio-
Economics, 25(3), pp. 395–401. 
  
Laffer, A. B. (2004). The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future. Backgrounder, no. 1765, June 
1, pp. 1–16. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation. 
 37 
 
  
Malcomson, J. M. (1986). Some analytics of the Laffer curve. Journal of Public Economics, 
29(3), pp. 263–279. 
  
Perloff, J. M. (2014). Microeconomics with Calculus. Third edition, Global edition, Pearson 
Series in Economics.  
 
RKA (2018). https://www.kolada.se [December 2018] 
  
SCB (2018). http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se [November 2018] 
 
Smith, Adam. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. First 
Edition, W. Strahan and T. Cadell.  
 
Stener, V. & Wintenstråle, T. (2016). På Lafferkurvans Sluttning: En ekonometrisk studie av 
vilken den pekuniära effekten är av förändringar i svenska kommuners skattesatser. Bachelor 
thesis, Department of Economics. Gothenburg: School of Business, Economics and Law, 
University of Gothenburg. http://hdl.handle.net/2077/54214 
  
Stuart, C. E. (1981). Swedish Tax Rates, Labor Supply, and Tax Revenue. Journal of Political 
Economy, 89(5), pp. 1020–1038. 
  
Wanniski, J. (1978). Taxes, Revenue, and the “Laffer Curve”. The Public Interest, winter 1978, 
50, pp. 3–16. 
 
Wooldrigde, Jeffery. M. (2016). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. 6th Edition, 
South-Western Cengage Learning. 
 
